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Against Arbitrariness: 
Architectural Signification  
in the Age of Globalization 
Rumiko Handa 
Department of Architecture, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Room 237 Architecture Hall West, Lincoln, NE 68588-0107, USA 
Abstract 
The theory of arbitrary signification, predominant during the last half century, 
considers architecture’s intrinsic properties as having little to do with its mean-
ing. Consequently, architecture’s significance is not based on itself but assigned 
externally. In the age of globalization, such an assignment is often ineffective. 
This paper will: (1) examine the post-WWII debates between the theories of 
arbitrary and natural signification; (2) relate these theories to more philosoph-
ical, historicist vs. normative positions; (3) discuss the implications concern-
ing conservation of culture, legitimacy of interpretation, and fake authenticity 
in construction; (4) and examine some architectural works that have brought 
forth natural signification in conventional forms. 
Keywords: architectural design, design philosophy, design theory, epistemol-
ogy, reasoning 
Recently constructed churches at the growing boundary of Lincoln, Nebraska, embody the problem we face today re-garding the significance of architecture (Figure 1). Here, 
the building has little to contribute toward its own value. In-
stead, any appreciation depends on the religious activities within, 
for which the building itself is a container. This is not just a prob-
lem of badly designed contemporary facilities. Many home-buy-
ers are convinced that, as long as a house satisfies their functional 
demands, location is everything. A house becomes merely a piece 
of real estate with a certain resale value. Behind these lie the prob-
lems of significance and of signification in our discipline. It is a 
problem of significance, for the value of architecture derives not 
so much from architecture itself as from something that is not ar-
chitecture. It is also a problem of signification, for it is rooted in 
the way the notion of architectural meaning itself is understood. 
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There are two, generally contradictory, theories of architec-
tural signification concerning the questions of why and how we 
associate a certain meaning with a piece of architecture. It is a 
question of episteme, or the ways in which we understand the 
relationship between a particular object we see before us and 
the meaning we may conceive lying behind it. According to one 
theory, in order for a piece of architecture to mean something, 
that meaning has to have been assigned. To many of those who 
hold this theory, what assigns a meaning to a piece is cultural 
convention. To others, including some architects and architec-
tural students, an individual is the one who assigns a mean-
ing. When one believes in the assigned nature of signification, 
whether by a culture or an individual, one tends to think that 
the only legitimate way to derive a meaning out of a piece is 
to go to the source that has assigned the signification. Accord-
ing to this view, the piece’s physical attributes have little to do 
with a meaning, that is, the relationship between the piece and 
its meaning is arbitrary. 
The theory of natural signification, on the other hand, gath-
ers meaning from the piece’s physical attributes, and therefore 
presumes architecture to be inherently motivated. According to 
Figure 1. Faith Bible Church, Lincoln, Nebraska, USA. © Michel Mason 
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this theory, a piece of architecture should display enough prop-
erties, be they the color, textures, sizes, or proportions, to evoke a 
certain meaning in a viewer’s mind. This theory implies that the 
meaning of an architectural piece is not dependent on the view-
er’s a priori knowledge of a certain culture or architect. Predomi-
nant in the eighteenth century and again at the beginning of this 
century, this theory was eclipsed when arbitrary signification be-
came popular in the middle of this century. 
The problem at hand, that architecture escapes being un-
derstood for its own qualities, is an ontological one: it concerns 
both the piece of architecture having little in itself to contribute 
toward its understanding and the viewer caring little about the 
piece’s intrinsic properties. This paper will, however, examine 
the problem from a specific point of view: architects, subscrib-
ing to the theory of arbitrary signification, have alienated the in-
trinsic properties of architecture from its significance, and have 
produced architecture accordingly. As a result, the general pub-
lic shows little enthusiasm in engaging themselves with physical 
properties of any building. 
The theory of arbitrary signification is less advantageous par-
ticularly in the age of globalization. Firstly, it puts people from 
other cultures at odds with meaning. To compare, a meaning 
based on natural signification is in principle globally accessible. 
If one assumes that architecture is valued when a viewer finds 
a meaning to it, then the theory of arbitrary signification shuns 
the value of architecture. The second disadvantage of the the-
ory of arbitrary signification concerns the notion of culture. Con-
trary to the common understanding, the assumption of arbitrari-
ness does not necessarily support preservation of cultures, and 
can instead alienate cultures. Although usually considered ar-
bitrary, most conventional form–meaning relationships have a 
non-arbitrary origin, and therefore it is not only possible but also 
beneficial for architects to add natural signification to their de-
signs even when they are dealing with culturally specific forms. 
In fact, as some examples will demonstrate, reinterpretation of 
conventional forms can bring forth the natural signification from 
physical properties. 
In order to arrive at the above conclusions, this paper will first 
examine the intellectual debates since the Second World War, in 
order to see how we have come to support arbitrary signification 
and all too often ignored or denied natural signification. This pa-
per will then locate the debate of the arbitrary vs. natural signi-
fication in a larger context of philosophical positions. In particu-
lar, it will be shown that the debate in hand reflects the debate on 
the more fundamental philosophical issues, namely that between 
historicist and normative positions, which has taken place since 
the mid-nineteenth century. Thirdly, the paper will discuss the 
implications of the theories of architectural signification in or-
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der to understand more fully what it might eventually mean to 
hold either position. The issues will include conservation of cul-
tural identity, legitimacy of interpretation, and fake authenticity 
in architectural production. In the end, architects will be advised 
to add natural signification to their designs. Some examples will 
demonstrate this recommendation, in which the reinterpreta-
tion of conventional forms has reinforced natural signification of 
physical properties. 
1 History of Arbitrary Signification 
1.1 Semiology in Architecture 
A regard for architecture as a system of signification is but 
one of many aspects of this century’s general interest in signs. 
According to Geoffrey Broadbent, the first publication on archi-
tectural signification is Roberto Pane’s Architettura e arti figura-
tive of 1948. In the English-speaking community, the entry was 
slightly delayed until the late 1960s.1 
The critics who considered architecture as a system of sig-
nification had a strong bias as to how a viewer derives a mean-
ing from a piece of architecture. Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Sau-
ssure had a strong influence in this regard, who claimed that 
“The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary.”2 
The architectural critics argued that, even if a form may origi-
nally be non-arbitrary in relation to its meaning, as soon as the 
form–meaning relationship becomes conventionalized, the form 
itself ceases to be the source of that meaning. In support of this 
view, both Charles Jencks and Umberto Eco referred to a housing 
project in Southern Italy, in which the residents washed olives in 
toilet bowls.3 These critics argued that a form, even one that de-
rived directly from its function, must be accompanied by a social 
convention or instructions for use, in order to carry that function 
as a meaning. Therefore, architectural meaning is said to be arbi-
trary, that is, a viewer cannot derive it directly from a form. 
The theory of arbitrary signification was also used to criti-
cize modernist ideology. Juan Pablo Bonta, in his 1979 book ar-
gued that the modernists did not understand that natural signs 
turn conventional as soon as they are accepted by society.4 Alan 
Colquhoun characterized modernists’ “expressionist theory” that 
“shapes have physiognomic or expressive content which com-
municates itself to us directly.”5 Instead, Colquhoun argued that 
forms were “very low in content, unless we attribute to these 
forms some system of conventional meanings not inherent in the 
forms themselves.” For Colquhoun, then, culture was a neces-
sary agent to elevate architecture above its “low content” to the 
level of meaning. 
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1.2 Postmodernism, Deconstruction, and Arbitrary 
Signification 
The theory of arbitrary signification. locating a meaning in 
something other than architecture itself. also grips neo-conserva-
tive postmodernists. They go even further to clearly separate the 
signification of architecture from architecture itself. In particular. 
with Robert Venturi’s concept of the decorated shed. the decora-
tion takes care of signification. while the shed. designed to ful-
fill the requirements of the program. is not expected to contribute 
to the meaning.6 Isolating the signifying form from the quintes-
sence of the building can also be seen in Michael Graves’s de-
signs. where the figurative appearance has little to do with the 
way the building is made.7 With Stanley Tigerman, while no one 
fails to find in the floor plan a pictorial resemblance of a certain 
object, that object has no relevance to the way the building is be-
ing used.8 
Deconstruction is not an exception, but rather an extreme 
when it comes to dissociating the meaning from the intrinsic 
properties of architecture. Peter Eisenman argues, in architecture 
“we do not have either an agreed-upon sign system or an elabo-
rated grammar.” From this, Eisenman proceeds to conclude that 
there is no meaning in architecture: 
In architecture, when you build a wall, not only is it really 
opaque, but its relationship to a signified is very difficult to artic-
ulate. A wall is a wall, it is not a word, it is, it is never about. It is 
the thing that the word “wall” refers to, it is the opposite condi-
tion of a word: words are transparent whereas walls are opaque.9 
Behind this logic is the assumption that any meaning needs 
an external system of assignment, or the theory of arbitrary sig-
nification. For Eisenman, architecture alone cannot be a source of 
meaning. 
The theory of arbitrary signification can lead to devaluating 
the interpretation of architecture all together. Under the assump-
tion of arbitrariness the agent of the assigned meaning, be it a 
culture or an individual architect. is the authority with absolute 
power over signification. Nothing else can legitimize any mean-
ing. This authority, however, can be extremely vulnerable. For, 
with architecture’s intrinsic properties indifferent toward signi-
fication, any viewer could claim authority for his/her own in-
terpretation, especially when the original signification is not 
known. This eventually results in the relativism of interpretation. 
In other words, interpreting architecture becomes a futile activ-
ity. Architecture designed with this conviction is non-significa-
tive. That is, any effort of making sense out of the piece will yield 
nothing significant. 
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2 Historicism in Support of Arbitrary Signification
2.1 Historicist vs. Normative Positions
In order to deepen our understanding of the theory of arbi-
trary signification, it is important to locate this theory in a larger 
context of epistemology, namely in the dichotomy between his-
toricist and normative positions.5 According to the normative po-
sition, typical of the eighteenth century, a particular grammar of 
a language is a mere stray from a general grammar, the immu-
table and general principles of language. History, similarly, is to 
discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, 
while historical transformation is a mere accident of the histori-
cal process. Continuing along the same line, architecture’s ethical 
and aesthetic value judgments, which can be obtained through 
the observation of the phenomenal world and the counsel of 
one’s own natural reason, are then applicable and valid for any 
time period or location.
In contrast, historicism began in the late eighteenth century, 
and considers differences in time and space as the direct out-
comes of the particular historical forces. Historicism in architec-
ture concurs with this viewpoint in so far as a historical style is 
considered a reflection of a particular period. While we tend to 
understand Zeitgeist in the Modern Movement as raised in objec-
tion to nineteenth-century eclecticism, Colquhoun points out that 
eclecticism and the concept of the Zeitgeist grow from the same 
root of historicism. The difference in the epistemology supported 
by the theory of arbitrary signification and that of natural signi-
fication reflects these different philosophical positions. Accord-
ing to the theory of arbitrary signification, to know a meaning 
of an architectural piece is to have the knowledge of the agent 
that has assigned a meaning to that piece. To compare, the theory 
of natural signification assumes that a meaning can be arrived at 
through the observation of the piece itself. In this difference lies 
the dichotomy between the historicist and normative positions.
Furthermore, we might say that the mind that supports the 
theory of arbitrary signification is typical to modernity, as long 
as we see, as Colquhoun did, the characteristics of modernity in 
historicism. Although we tend to disengage postmodernism and 
deconstruction of architecture from the early modernist ideol-
ogy, we might here find a particular modernity in these postwar 
schools of architectural thought.
2.2 Significance of Typology
The dichotomy between the theories of arbitrary and natural 
signification can be a tricky issue to those who are used to under-
standing a theoretical position by oppositions. Unfortunately, the 
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typical modern mind tends to be quick in categorizing various 
positions into polar opposites. As a result, if two positions agree 
on something, they tend to be seen as agreeing with each other in 
totality. 
An illuminating comparison can be made between the two 
positions concerning typology, namely of Colquhoun and of Car-
roll Westfall.10 Both architectural historians strongly support the 
significance of types, and yet their theoretical positions are to-
tally different: one holds the historicist position, while the other 
the normative position. In particular, while Colquhoun consid-
ers that type is important because of the deposit of meanings 
through time, Westfall thinks that type is fundamentally based 
on the form’s natural signification.
3 Implications of Arbitrary Signification
Just as any position, the theory of arbitrary signification needs 
to be evaluated for its implications. Three controversial issues are 
the question of ownership, the question of legitimate interpreta-
tion, and the question of making. We will see that the theory of 
natural signification cannot go through these issues unscathed, 
or without adjustment.
3.1 Question of Ownership: Cultural Identity vs. 
Alienation
Who, if anyone, owns architectural signification? In the 
case of arbitrary signification, those who have assigned and 
who share the particular signification have the ownership. This 
question has implications for the issues of cultural identity and 
alienation.
Many people endorse conventional signification just as they 
support cultural identity and conservation. Generally speak-
ing, sharing something with a limited number of people creates 
a sense of belonging to a particular community. This is the case 
with the convention of architectural signification. It is, however, 
a danger if we concluded from the above that the theory of arbi-
trary signification is in support of cultural identity and conser-
vation. On the contrary, arbitrary signification can cause cultural 
alienation and be detrimental to the conservation of culture, par-
ticularly under globalization. 
First of all, arbitrary signification can alienate architectural 
pieces from possible viewers who may be willing to appreciate 
the artifacts but who do not share the signification. Many who 
are foreign to the culture are in this category. To make sense 
out of the piece they need to learn that convention. In order to 
learn, according to the theory of arbitrary signification, they have 
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to take the words of those who own the convention. In no other 
way can they evaluate any interpretation. The least legitimate is 
to observe the piece itself, the natural way to appreciate an ar-
tifact. For, according to the theory of arbitrary signification, the 
piece itself has nothing to do with rightful signification. 
The danger of alienation exists not only in a viewer foreign 
to the assigned signification, but also in a piece itself. An archi-
tectural piece that depends for its value on something other than 
its inherent properties is at the mercy of exterior conditions such 
as a change in usage or a shift in real estate market. In this case, 
architecture is alienated from its own value source. In compari-
son, natural signification is beneficial. Contrary to common be-
lief, conventional signification is not necessarily arbitrary. In fact, 
in many cases, conventional signification is at least partly sup-
ported by natural signification. Take the example of a pyramid. 
As Karsten Harries has rightly put, although we consider the 
signification of a pyramid to be conventional, in that “Any pyr-
amid we erect harks back to its Egyptian precursors and to the 
function of these structures,” the signification is usually not com-
pletely arbitrary:
there is something about the simple geometry of the form that 
makes it not an accident that Egyptians seized on it as they did: 
the conventional symbol presupposes and builds on a natural 
symbol.11
One can design an architectural piece in such a way that it 
will have physical properties in itself that support the significa-
tion by convention. A viewer then has a chance of experiencing 
the piece for its own sake, as well as for its conventional signifi-
cation. This will make the piece of architecture available and ac-
cessible instead of alienating.
Consider a design for a memorial. A memorial is usually 
strongly associated with a certain group of people and it has to 
take the best possible care of the emotional and spiritual needs 
of those particular individuals. Simultaneously, however, a me-
morial also needs to make others aware and understand the sig-
nificance of what it commemorates. In fact, the worst service a 
memorial could do is to alienate those who are not directly in-
volved. Here, the more arbitrary the conventional form–meaning 
relationship may be, the more that signification needs to be sup-
ported by the artifact’s intrinsic properties.
3.2 Question of Legitimate Interpretation: Multiple 
Meaning
Closely related to the question of ownership is the question of 
legitimacy. On the one hand, according to the theory of arbitrary 
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signification, which restricts the ownership to those who have as-
signed the meaning and to those who share that assignment, the 
only legitimate interpretation is the one identical to the original 
meaning. On the other hand, the theory of natural signification 
allows any significative properties of an architectural piece to be 
the basis of a meaning. If legitimacy implies definitive meaning, 
then the natural signification might not be a good idea. Does the 
theory of natural signification end up with the relativism of inter-
pretation, just as Deconstruction did? 
Here it is important to recognize difficulties of locating legiti-
macy in the original meaning. First of all, it is not always possible 
to determine the original meaning. And more importantly, the 
original meaning does not necessarily help architecture to stay 
significant in the age of globalization. 
In order to illustrate these questions, Edmund Burke’s pas-
sage on Stonehenge bears relevance: 
The great stones, it has been supposed, were originally monu-
ments of illustrious men, or the memorials of considerable ac-
tion: or they were landmarks for deciding the bounds of fixed 
property. In time, the memory of the persons or facts which 
these stones were erected to perpetuate wore away; but the rev-
erence which custom, and probably certain periodical ceremo-
nies, had preserved for those places was not so soon obliter-
ated. The monuments themselves then came to be venerated; 
and not the less because the reason for venerating them was no 
longer known.12 
According to Robert Jan van Pelt, “Burke argued that this 
megalithic monument had become the most sacred of the English 
monuments because its original intention had been forgotten.”10 
To get to the correct, originally intended meaning is not always 
possible. In addition, knowing the original meaning is not neces-
sarily a requisite for a piece to be significant. Furthermore, know-
ing the original meaning does not necessarily mean that the piece 
is thereby significant.
The above questions concerning legitimate interpretation or 
the kind of signification that supports the piece’s significance can 
be observed in the development of hermeneutics during the last 
two centuries. In the discipline of hermeneutics, the definition of 
meaning (or of understanding) shifted from the original meaning 
to the ontological meaning, from the eighteenth-century Roman-
tic hermeneutics of Friedrich Schleiermacher to the twentieth- 
century Phenomenological hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger 
and Hans-Georg Gadamer.
For Friedrich Schleiermacher, the meaning was fixed by the 
author’s intention. Understanding the author’s meaning was the 
goal of interpretation. Schleiermacher, however, was not uncog-
nisant of the factors that made it difficult to reach the author’s 
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meaning. First, the author was not fully conscious of the mean-
ing. Second, the text may be inadequate for the meaning. There-
fore, Schleiermacher thought that the interpreter’s role was to 
understand the author better than the author. 
He is distinctly Romantic in assuming that cultural interchange 
involves a simple identity between author and reader and that 
meaning is fixed by the author’s intention. He assumes, more-
over, a certain inadequacy in written texts, overcome through 
understanding as translinguistic contact between individuals.… 
At the psychological level, for instance, “subjective-historical” 
reading reconstructs the author’s intention; but “subjective-div-
inatory” reading projects a meaning not yet expressed in the text, 
thus allowing Schleiermacher to make his often-cited statement 
that the reader understands the text better than the author does.13 
The above way of understanding the legitimacy of meaning can 
be seen not only in Schleiermacher but also in Immanuel Kant in 
the following statement about Plato:
I need only to remark that it is by no means unusual … to find 
that we understand him better than he has understood him-
self. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has 
sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own 
intention.14
In addition, in art history, Erwin Panofsky’s iconology be-
longed to this discussion. Panofsky categorized meaning into 
three levels, and the ultimate goal of iconology was to get to the 
original meaning, which was not usually recognized consciously 
by the artist.
In the twentieth century, the recognition of the historicity of 
both the author and the reader has brought the hermeneutic dis-
cussions to another, ontological level. With Martin Heidegger and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, the historicity of those who have made an 
object and who interpret it has become a given. In other words, it 
is now assumed that the two have backgrounds not necessarily 
identical to each other. Meaning of an object, which lies before the 
interpreter, then, is not something to be found in the author, but 
to be reconstructed by the interpreter in such a way that there is a 
recognition of a “horizon,” shared between the author and the in-
terpreter in regard to this object. Understanding is not necessarily 
meant to reach the exactitude of the author’s meaning, neither is 
it to impose the interpreter’s peculiar condition onto the object be-
ing interpreted. It is supposed to appreciate the fact that the object 
is the way it is (how it has been conceived, made, and conserved), 
and was made possible by other fellow human beings.
By taking understanding to be not of the original meaning, 
but to lie in the fact that the piece relates itself to the reader’s life-
a g a i n s t  a r b i t r a r i n e s s : a r c h i t e c t u r a l  s i g n i f i c at i o n  i n  t h e  a g e  o f  g l o b a l i z at i o n    373
15. Eco, U., Interpretation and Overinter-
pretation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). 
16. Gadamer, H.-G., Truth and Method 
(New York: Crossroad, 1990). 
world, the difference between the reader and the author of the 
background, historicity in another word, is no longer a hindrance 
to interpretation.
Unlike in previous hermeneutic theory, the historicality of the in-
terpreter is not a barrier to comprehension. A truly hermeneutic 
thinking must take into account its own historicality (die eigene 
Geschichtlichkeit mitdenken). It is only a “proper hermeneutics” 
when it demonstrates the effectivity (Wirkung) of history within 
understanding itself.13
Gadamer’s hermeneutics is therefore not a simple return to the 
normative point of view, to which historicism was reactionary. 
Instead, he tries to incorporate historicity as a fact into the con-
cept of understanding.
The above ontological interpretation, including Burke’s about 
Stonehenge, should be clearly differentiated from any meaning by 
the reader. Umberto Eco, for one, has warned of the “overinterpre-
tation” by the free play of the intentio lectoris, the intention by the 
reader, and instead proposed the intentio operis, based “upon the 
text as a coherent whole.”15 In other words, including historicity 
of the author and the reader does not mean that anything that the 
reader comes up with is legitimate as an interpretation. In this re-
gard, Gadamer explains Heidegger in the importance of examin-
ing the object in itself, in order for the interpreter to avoid impos-
ing one’s own illegitimate and inappropriate prejudice:
All correct interpretation must be on guard against arbitrary 
fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of 
thought, and it must direct its gaze “on the things themselves” 
(which, in the case of the literary critic, are meaningful texts, 
which themselves are again concerned with objects). For the in-
terpreter to let himself be guided by the things themselves is ob-
viously not a matter of a single, “conscientious” decision, but 
is “the first, last, and constant task.” For it is necessary to keep 
one’s gaze fixed on the thing throughout all the constant distrac-
tions that originate in the interpreter himself. A person who is 
trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a 
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning 
emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only be-
cause he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard 
to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is 
constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into 
the meaning, is understanding what is there.16 
The possible interpretation that Burke had in front of Stonehenge 
should be clearly differentiated from any meaning by the reader. 
A further discussion can be found in the work of Paul Ricoeur. 
One of those who at an early stage acknowledged a paradox be-
tween universal civilization and national cultures, Ricoeur ad-
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vanced the two-fold approach in his phenomenological herme-
neutics: appropriation and distanciation.17 In the first, the goal 
in interpreting a text lies not so much in arriving at the subjec-
tive intention of the author, but rather in the appropriation of the 
text.18 Here, to appropriate a text through interpretation should 
be considered, as in the word’s Latin etymological root appro-
priare, to make one’s own. Appropriation of text is in fact what 
Ricoeur regards as the significance of his hermeneutics: 
the very work of interpretation reveals a profound inten-
tion, that of overcoming distance and cultural differences 
and of matching the reader to a text which has become for-
eign, thereby incorporating its meaning into the present 
comprehension a man is able to have of himself.19 
The goal of interpreting a piece of architecture under such 
conditions is then to make it one’s own even without the assign-
ment of a meaning. 
Ricoeur’s second issue, distanciation, is that an interpretation 
can be explained in its non-arbitrary relation to the text in and of 
itself. An interpretation can then be submitted for rational argu-
ment away from the subjective realm of the author or the inter-
preter. One can then study the physical attributes and properties 
of a piece, in its parts, whole, and relation to others, in arriving at 
a meaningful, that is, appropriated interpretation, or in evaluat-
ing any given interpretation. 
The author, or the architect, plays a crucial role, not for the 
meaning he/she might assign to a form, but precisely in purpose-
fully designing the physical properties of architecture in a non-
arbitrary manner so that it may later be interpreted in a non-ar-
bitrary way. The physical properties, which had embodied the 
author’s meaning to the author, persist even after being detached 
from the author and his/her meaning. Only with these properties 
can a later appropriation and distanciation be possible. The piece’s 
attributes allow the interpreter to derive his/her own appropri-
ated interpretation, in addition to anchoring the interpretation. 
3.3 Question of Making: Fake Authenticity 
Fake authenticity is a problem both theories of signification 
face in today’s context.20 When an object was authentic, say, in a 
homogeneous society of the past, the object had an integrity in it-
self, between the materials, the structure, the way of making, and 
the shape. To compare, today, when the development of technol-
ogy has provided with the means of communication, transpor-
tation, and of construction, the integrity of an object is a difficult 
goal to achieve. When we try to create a conventional form, there 
tends to be a discrepancy in the product, for we have already 
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changed the materials and means of construction, thereby creat-
ing fakeness. The piece may visually resemble the original, but is 
quite different from the original in how it is made. 
This problem is especially apparent in the modern steel stud 
construction in which the steel studs take care of the structure 
but are expected to be hidden by the surface finish material. The 
cladding materials, stone for example, sliced so thin to be held by 
the studs, are deprived of their own intrinsic—structural, ther-
mal, acoustic—properties. In addition. the steel stud construction 
allows acrobatic shapes with welding techniques, easily defeat-
ing the integrity of this system of vertical walls. 
4 Fusing Natural Signification into Convention 
Tadao Ando’s work reveals an architect’s efforts to keep the 
intrinsic properties of architecture intact with significance and 
signification. His work encourages a viewer to make an inter-
pretation that is anchored in the piece’s physical properties more 
than anything, and that allows the piece to be significant, in the 
fullest sense of this word, to the interpreter with or without ref-
erence to a convention. Commenting on Ando’s buildings, Jackie 
Kestenbaum demonstrates this point: 
To visit an Ando building is to relinquish all presuppositions 
about architecture and take on Ando’s Weltanschauung … to ne-
gotiate an Ando building is an arduous task, alternative exertion 
with contemplation, a process whereby the spatial phenomenon 
imprints itself upon the mind and body and resonate for days. … 
It is the resonance one feels in holy places, where personal mem-
ory is not a prerequisite, where the place itself bears the weight.21 
In the Church of Light (Figure 2), as in many other buildings 
by Ando, one encounters a carefully selected, limited number of 
building materials treated to their physical extreme. The inten-
tion is to present the materials in their utmost essence. Ando 
tries “to choose materials as a poet chooses words and to give 
them the most appropriate forms of expression.”22 For example, 
Ando insists on concrete mixture so hard that it is almost impos-
sible to distribute the material between panels. As a result, his 
concrete walls are dense and solid to the extreme limit. By push-
ing the material’s physical properties almost to the impossible, 
the architect intends to create a structure that by itself evokes the 
non-physical. 
For the same reason, Ando is not at all sympathetic to the use 
of new industrial materials in a traditional form. A pseudo-au-
thentic application is for him not a pursuit of the material’s in-
trinsic potential: 
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By trying to reproduce in modern materials (concrete and steel) 
and their suitable techniques, forms that came into being in re-
lation to Japan’s traditional building material (wood) amounted 
to ignoring the inevitable and fundamental connections between 
material and form. For this reason buildings making this attempt 
sustained many difficulties and before long, ceased to emerge.23 
In Ando’s church, even a cross is no longer a mere Christian 
symbol whose meaning relies on the conventional endowment. In-
stead, the architect has turned it into the vertical and the horizon-
tal linear openings in the otherwise solid concrete wall, full of in-
trinsic properties that pronounce signification. By carefully creating 
the void at the end of the room, the architect succeeds in embody-
ing the sense, so appropriate for the religious practice, of time and 
space beyond reach. The intrinsic properties of architecture encour-
Figure 2. Tadao Ando, Church of Light, 
Osaka, Japan. © Shinkenchiku-sha 
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age respect for the past, commitment to the future, as well as trust 
in the universal applicability and effectiveness of one’s particular 
religious activity, which in turn is limited by its place and time. 
With Kara-za (Figure 3), a theater intended to be temporal and 
portable, it is not at all difficult to discern Vitruvius’s ideal theater 
with four equilateral triangles. Ando, however, is not so much in-
terested in deriving a meaning from an architectural type whose 
meaning is endowed by tradition, as to search for “the original 
form of space.”24 For Ando, it is not that the East held the twelve-
year cycle in its calendar, or the West counts twelve months in a 
year, that assigns meaning to the dodecagon. Instead, Ando be-
lieves that there is something inherent in the dodecagon that has 
allowed twelve to be a perfect number in different cultures, just as 
it allows the architect, either Vitruvius or Ando, to represent the 
notion of the world or the cosmos in this form: 
Figure 3. Tadao Ando, Kara-za, Tokyo, 
Japan. © Shinkenchiku-sha 
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I think a dodecagon represents the world. The number twelve is 
symbolic of the cosmos. In Japan, there are twelve animals cor-
responding to the twelve-year cycle of the calendar. In the West 
there are twelve months to a year and so forth.25
For making a world, Ando uses a bridge as both a connector 
and separator between the world outside the theater and a sec-
ond within the theater. In reference to his Japanese Pavilion for 
Expo. ‘92, Ando stated, “The bridge in this pavilion takes visitors 
to a fictional world, a world of dreams. Then again, it is a bridge 
spanning East and West.”21 Making a world, supported by the in-
trinsic properties of architectural design, works especially well in 
the case of a theater. A theater, after all, is a place in which a pro-
duction, with its specificity of time and place, represents what is 
universal in time and place. The world of production is nothing 
Figure 4. Tadao Ando, Forest of Tombs 
Museum, Kumamoto, Japan.  
© Shinkenchiku-sha 
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but an illusion that disappears as soon as the play is over, and 
yet, the truths about humanity told in this fragile production stay 
alive beyond the production as long as they are remembered. 
Supporting this notion of theater as a temporary creation of an il-
lusory world, which in turn is applicable beyond the theater pro-
duction, is the use of scaffolding as the building’s structure made 
visible at eye level as well as at the central pinnacle of the space. 
Here, once again, the material is presented to the viewer in its 
purest possible condition. The result is a traveling theater that is 
rich in architectural properties that have high potential for gen-
erating interpretations, without relying on any specific cultural 
training or knowledge on the part of the viewer. 
In the Forest of Tombs Museum (Figure 4), although the geo-
metric composition may come from the form of ancient tombs, 
the meaning does not depend on this reference. Instead, geome-
try provides “the foundation or framework that enables a work 
of architecture to have presence.”21 The pure geometry of circle, 
grid, and diagonal, together with the pure materials of reinforced 
concrete, is to embody in the particular some essence of the eter-
nal and the infinite. 
Figure 5. Tadao Ando, Water Temple, Hyogok, Japan. © Shinkenchiku-sha 
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In this museum, the most significant space is that created be-
tween the orthogonal of the grid and the diagonal. Here, topped 
by a clear skylight with a minimum metal frame, the space is di-
rectly connected to the sky, suggesting the universal. 
And finally, in the Water Temple (Figure 5), historically based 
typology for Buddhist temples has disappeared altogether. In-
stead, the water is the element of nature, controlled by the archi-
tect’s design. When one descends the stairs, to a level below the 
water’s surface, its physical and intrinsic properties bring signifi-
cance and signification to this piece of architecture. 
Trusting architecture’s intrinsic properties, when they are 
pure to the point of abstraction and rudiment, is not an easy 
path. To gain from them both signification and significance re-
quires commitment and effort from the architect and the general 
public. Neither will be able to take refuge in the naive relativism 
of, “anything can mean anything,” or “that is just your opinion.” 
However, this may be the path for architecture to regain its sig-
nificance for the next millennium and a way for every person on 
the earth to take humanistic challenge and satisfaction in return 
for appreciating a fellow man’s artifice. 
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